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regulation of insurance exemption,
the circuit court acknowledged that
the ERISA preemption clause has
limits, the principal one reserving
state authority to regulate insurance.
However, after reviewing the
definitions of "insurance" and
"regulation," the circuit court found
Anderson's argument unpersuasive.
Because ERISA failed to define either
"insurance" or "regulation," the
court turned to a similar statute, the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, which also
permits state regulation of insurance,
for guidance. On the basis of this
statute, the court determined that
"insurance" requires a risk pooling

component and state regulation is
restricted to this domain.
Anderson, however, had not
relied on any state law regulating the
methods of pooling risks or prices to
be charged in her complaint. Rather,
she had based her argument on an
all-purpose truth-in-business
statute. Finding this statute more
applicable to used car salesmen and
promotional literature for vacuum
cleaners than HMOs, the court

reasoned that the truth-in-business
statute did not directly apply to
insurance at all. Therefore, it held
that her complaint did not fall within

an exception to ERISA preemption on
the basis of the state authority to
regulate insurance.
The court concluded that
Anderson's state law claim, relating
to a medical benefits package
regulated by ERISA, was preempted

by federal law. Furthermore, the
circuit court did not find any
exemption to federal preemption
based on state authority to regulate
insurance. It affirmed the district
court's dismissal of Anderson's
claim for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.

Car lessees' early-termination rights spelled out
By JenniferL. Fitzgerald
In Highsmith v. Chrysler CreditCorp., 18 F.3d 434
(7th Cir. 1994), the Seventh U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a cause of action under the Illinois
Consumer Fraud Act accrues when an automobile
lessee knows or reasonably should have known that the
lessor misrepresented its rights and liabilities to the
lessee. Moreover, the court found that a lessee, demonstrating no intent to terminate an automobile lease,
lacks standing to seek a declaratory judgment on
whether an early termination provision violates state
law. However, the court recognized a lessee's right to
state a claim for inadequate disclosure of the contract's
termination formula and any manufacturer's warranties
under the Consumer Leasing Act.

Harmful provisions
The plaintiffs in this consolidated action, Kevin and
Macita Highsmith and Joseph Villasenor, each signed a
consumer automobile lease with the Chrysler Credit
Corporation ("Chrysler"). In both cases the disputed
lease stated that the lessee, on either condition of
default or early termination, would be liable for early
termination charges calculated according to the provisions of the lease.
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Kevin and Macita Highsmith signed a four-year
lease for a Plymouth Sundance on March 10, 1987.
Eighteen months later they filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition and named Chrysler as one of their
creditors. The bankruptcy court entered an order
rejecting the lease and Chrysler repossessed the
automobile. On April 25, 1989, Chrysler, having sold
the automobile, determined that the Highsmiths had
terminated their lease. It contended that the Highsmiths
were liable for an additional $5,400 in penalty fees
under the early termination provisions of their lease.
Chrysler subsequently filed suit in state court to
recover the alleged deficiency. However, after the
Highsmiths refiled their bankruptcy petition, Chrysler
dismissed its complaint to comply with the conditions
of the bankruptcy proceeding. The Highsmiths then
brought an adversary action against Chrysler, alleging
that the automobile lease violated both federal and state
law. The bankruptcy court found these claims beyond
the scope of its jurisdiction, and the suit was moved to
federal court.
Subsequently, the Highsmiths amended their
complaint, adding Joseph Villasenor as a plaintiff.
Villasenor, like the Highsmiths, had signed a four-year
lease with Chrysler. However, he did not seek to
terminate this lease nor did he express any intent to do
so. Rather, Villasenor only sought a declaratory
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judgment regarding the consequences of early termination of the automobile lease.
In the amended complaint, the Highsmiths alleged
that: (1) the automobile lease violated provisions of the
federal Consumer Leasing Act; (2) the lease violated
the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act and its Michigan
counterpart; and (3) the early termination penalties of
the lease were unenforceable under Illinois law. In
addition to these allegations, Villasenor contended that
the lease violated the Consumer Leasing Act's disclosure requirements under 15 U.S.C. § 1667a.
The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois dismissed all of the Highsmith's
claims. It held that all of their federal claims were timebarred. The court then used its discretion and dismissed
the state claims without prejudice. Turning to
Villasenor's claims, the district court held that he lacked
standing to raise issues about the early termination
provisions of the lease and dismissed these claims. It
also dismissed his claim regarding the lease's disclosure
violations for failure to state a claim. Finally, the
district court dismissed all of Villasenor's state claims
because no federal claims remained.
The Highsmiths then appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. On appeal,
they only challenged the dismissal of their claim under
the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act. Villasenor challenged
the dismissal of his federal and state claims for lack of
standing as well as the dismissal of his claim of
disclosure violations under 15 U.S.C. § 1667a.

Fraud alleged
In their appeal, the Highsmiths alleged that Chrysler
violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act ("Illinois Consumer Fraud
Act"), chapter 815, sections 505/1-505/12 of the
Illinois Compiled Statutes, because it "imposed
unreasonable termination charges" and "misrepresented
the lessee's rights and responsibilities." The Illinois
Consumer Fraud Act requires that a plaintiff bring a
claim for violation of the act within three years of the
date the cause of action accrues. The Highsmiths argued
that the cause of action accrued on April 25, 1989, the
date that they suffered pecuniary harm from Chrysler's
conduct. However, Chrysler contended that the limita-
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tions period began the date the Highsmiths signed their
lease.
In ruling that the cause of action accrued on March
10, 1987, the date of the lease, the district court relied
on Van Gessel v. Folds, 569 N.E.2d 141 (I11. App. Ct.
1991). In Van Gessel, the Illinois Appellate Court held
that the discovery rule does not apply in those situations
where a plaintiff discovers a cause of action within the
limitations period and has a reasonable time to file suit.
Applying the appellate court's reasoning to the present
case, the district court determined that the Highsmiths
discovered their cause of action within the limitations
period. Moreover, the court stated that the Highsmiths
could have reasonably filed a claim within the statutory
period.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the lower
court's decision, preferring the "discovery rule"
articulated in Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 430
N.E.2d 976 (Ill. 1981). According to this standard, a
cause of action accrues when a plaintiff knows or
reasonably should have known that an injury exists.
Turning to the present case, the circuit court held that
the Highsmiths' cause of action accrued when they
knew or reasonably should have known that Chrysler
had misrepresented their liability. It therefore concluded
that whether the Highsmiths had discovered the alleged
misrepresentations between October, 1988, and
October, 1991, when they filed suit, was a question of
fact to be determined by the district court.
On appeal, Villasenor sought a declaratory judgment
on whether his lease provision, which called for an
immediate acceleration of all monthly payments due
without a discount to present value, was an unenforceable penalty under Illinois law. The Seventh Circuit
dismissed this claim for lack of standing. The circuit
court agreed that Villasenor lacked standing to seek a
declaratory judgement because he failed to meet the
constitutional mandate requiring federal courts to
adjudicate only actual "cases" or "controversies." In
order to meet the case-or-controversy requirement, he
needed to plead clearly that he had sustained, or was in
immediate danger of sustaining, a direct injury caused
by Chrysler's wrongful conduct. Since Villasenor had
not terminated his lease, he could not plead such injury
and thus failed to satisfy this requirement.
Villasenor also appealed the district's court dismissal
of his claim that the early termination provision,
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requiring acceleration of all payments due without a
discount reflecting the time value of money, violated 15
U.S.C. § 1667b(b). After its review of the claim, the
circuit court affirmed the lower court's decision and
held that Villasenor failed to state a cause of action.
Specifically, the Seventh Circuit recognized that the
statute requires a factual basis to demonstrate that the
early termination charge was unreasonable in light of
anticipated or actual harm. Because Villasenor had not
terminated his lease, there was no basis for an allegation of harm.

Disclosures required
Finally, Villasenor alleged that Chrysler violated the
Consumer Leasing Act in two respects. First, he
contended that Chrysler had not disclosed the complete
formula it used in calculating early termination charges,
thus violating 15 U.S.C. § 1667a(11). Second, he
contended that Chrysler failed to identify all warranties
provided by the manufacturer to the lessee, thus
violating 15 U.S.C. § 1667a(6). On review, the Seventh
Circuit reversed the district court on both of these
counts, holding that Villasenor stated a valid claim
under both sections.
Villasenor, on appeal, contended that the formula
Chrysler used for the early termination charge disclosed

in the lease differed from the formula it used regularly
in practice. Specifically, he claimed that the formula
given in the lease contained a reduction not utilized in
the actual computations made by Chrysler when a
penalty was assessed.
In its analysis of this issue, the circuit court first
turned to the statutory provision in question. The
Consumer Leasing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1667a(11), requires
every lessor to provide a statement describing the
amount or method for determining any penalty or other
charge for delinquency, default, late payment or early
termination in each consumer lease. Although determining whether such a discrepancy existed was a matter for
the district court, the circuit court recognized that the
failure to disclose the entire formula for calculating
early termination charge was a technical violation of the
disclosure provision found in 15 U.S.C. § 1667a(11)
and other regulations. As such, dismissal of the claim
had been improper and the issue was remanded.
Villasenor also contended that Chrysler failed to
identify the warranties provided by the manufacturer to
the lessee, thus violating federal law. Specifically, he
contended that the Consumer Leasing Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1667a(6) requires the lessor to provide a statement
identifying all express warranties and guarantees made
by the manufacturer.
Pleasesee "Lessees' rights" on page 36

Requirement to split utility expenses actionable
By Michael Sullivan
In Legg v. Castruccio,642 A.2d
906 (Md. 1994), the Maryland Court
of Special Appeals held that a
landlord commits a deceptive or
unfair business practice under the
Maryland Consumer Protection Act
("CPA"), section 13-102 of the
Commercial Law Article of the
Maryland Code, by requiring a
tenant to obtain utility services
measured by a meter that, unknown
to the tenant, also services another
rental unit. However, a tenant
waives her cause of action if she
learns of the arrangement and
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consents to it. Moreover, the court
held that a tenant may sustain a
cause of action against her landlord
for breach of covenant of quiet
enjoyment, provided the tenant
complains about the situation and
the landlord fails to respond after a
sufficient period of time.

Separate accounts
In spring 1987, Deborah Legg
leased the first floor of a two-story
house from Sadie and Peter
Castruccio on a verbal, month-tomonth basis. At that time, the
Castruccios informed Legg that she

would have to establish her own gas
and electric account with the local
utility company. However, they
failed to inform her that her utility
bill would include charges for both
the first and second floor apartments.
Subsequently, the Castruccios
leased the previously unoccupied
second floor apartment to David
Bushell, who orally agreed to pay
Legg one-fourth of her utility bills.
Throughout his tenancy, Bushell
regularly paid his share for utilities.
In summer 1988, the Castruccios
leased the second floor apartment to
Julie Papilon and Vinnie Harcourt.
The landlords orally informed the
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prospective tenants that they would
have to pay one half of Legg's utility
bills. Papilon and Harcourt subsequently made an oral promise to
Legg to pay one-half of her utility
bills. The Castruccios documented
this agreement by recording a note
in their rent ledger.

Tenants decide to leave
Beginning in July 1990, about
two years after the initial agreement
with Legg, Papilon and Harcourt
stopped paying for most of their
utility usage. Between July 1990 and
December 1991, they accumulated
$2,155.36 in utility expenses.
Papilon and Harcourt paid Legg
$140 of this amount.
During this period, Legg complained to the Castruccios, asking
that separate meters be installed in
the house. Although the landlords
stated that they "would take care of
it," they took no action against
Papilon and Harcourt and did not
install separate meters.
In early November 1991, Papilon
and Harcourt moved out of their
apartment. They left an outstanding
utility bill of $2015.36. At that time,
Legg was in arrears with the utility
company, in part because of the
upstairs tenants' delinquency.
Subsequently, the Castruccios
brought suit against Legg in the
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel
County for repossession of rented
property. On the day of trial, Legg
filed a counterclaim against her
landlords. In her amended complaint, she sought rent abatement,
damages, and attorney fees from the
Castruccios, alleging that they had
illegally leased her an unsafe
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apartment in an unlicensed multiple
dwelling. She also alleged that the
Castruccios had engaged in unfair or
deceptive trade practices in the
rental of consumer property by
representing that the upstairs tenants
in her building would pay one-half
of the utility expenses.
On May 5, 1991, both parties
resolved all of the disputed issues
except whether the Castruccios had
any responsibility for Legg's unpaid
utility bills. On this issue, the trial
court held that the Castruccios
refusal to pay for the utilities of the
upstairs tenants did not: (1) create a
dangerous defect; (2) create an
illegal appropriation of utility
charges; (3) breach the covenant of
quiet enjoyment; (4) breach an
agreement to pay for such service;
or (5) violate the CPA as a deceptive
or unfair trade practice or the
Federal Trade Commission ("Frc")
consumer unfairness doctrine.
Legg appealed the lower court's
ruling, presenting three questions for
review by the Maryland Special
Court of Appeals. These included:
whether a landlord's failure to
inform a tenant that she was
responsible for all charges on her
utility meter, including those of
other tenants, violated the CPA;
whether a landlord's burdening of
one tenant with the potential utility
bills of another tenant violated the
CPA; and whether a landlord,
through such a burdening, breached
the covenant of quiet enjoyment.

Actual loss required
The CPA was designed to protect
consumers from unfair or deceptive
business practices, including certain
practices involved in apartment

leasing. For a private consumer to
sustain a cause of action under the
CPA, she must demonstrate an actual
injury or loss resulting from an
activity prohibited by the statute.
This requirement serves, in part, to
discourage consumers from bringing
CPA claims to harass or coerce
merchants.
Legg first asserted that the
Castruccios deceived her by leasing
the first floor apartment without
notification that her utility bill
would include the usage of the
second floor apartment. She contended that such behavior constituted a "failure to disclose a material
fact," and violated the CPA's
proscription of deceptive business
practices. Citing Golt v. Phillips
Bros. &Assocs., 517 A.2d 328 (Md.
1986), Legg contended that a fact
was material if "a significant number
of unsophisticated consumers would
attach importance to the information
in determining a choice of action."
In its analysis, the court agreed
with Legg, concluding that a
significant number of unsophisticated consumers would attach
importance to whether their utility
bill would include the utility usage
of other tenants. It held that the
Castruccios, by not disclosing this
fact to Legg prior to the beginning
of her tenancy, had violated the CPA
for failing to state a material fact.
Nevertheless, the court dismissed
the claim, finding that Legg had
waived her right to recover by
remaining on the premises and
consenting to the billing arrangement. Because of this waiver, any
injury that Legg sustained resulted
from the other tenants' delinquency,
and not from the landlords' failure
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